The Planned Axis Invasion of Malta

The strategic location of Malta, halfway between Italy and the North African coast, often led to it playing a critical role throughout history. It was no different during World War Two, when, as the only Allied base between Gibraltar and Alexandria, it was ideally located for British air and naval units based there to attack Axis shipping transporting vital supplies and reinforcements from Europe to North Africa. Indeed, whenever British striking units based in Malta were strong, the Axis forces in North Africa were usually short of petrol and supplies. On the other hand, when the enemy intensified its air attacks on the island, keeping British forces there in check, Axis fortunes in North Africa improved.

Malta's strategic location at the centre of the Mediterranean Sea (O H 237, Mediterranee 02 EN, CC BY-SA 4.0)

From mid-1940 to 1942, Malta became embroiled in a life-and-death struggle. The British were determined to maintain their hold on the island at all costs, as failure to do so could lead to the loss of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East’s oil reserves. On the other hand, the Axis powers aimed to neutralise it through air bombardment and sea blockade. In the end, Malta resisted the heavy onslaught, with its people earning the respect of many, including the British monarch, George VI, who bestowed upon them the George Cross. Crucially, Malta’s survival dented Axis ambitions in the region. In hindsight, the failure of the Italians and Germans to mount an invasion was a grave mistake. Yet this does not mean that such a plan had never been considered.

Background

A cursory glance at a map of the Mediterranean immediately reveals why Malta has such a high strategic value. Despite its small size and lack of natural resources, its location around 50 miles south of Sicily, 175 miles east of Tunisia, and 200 miles north of Libya, has throughout the centuries made it highly attractive to numerous foreign military powers, who knew that whoever held it also held the key to dominance of the Mediterranean. First inhabited around 6500 BC, Malta was successively ruled by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Swabians, Angevins, Aragonese, and Spain. In 1530, the Knights of St. John made it their home for the next 268 years, successfully defending it from a major Ottoman attack in the process, before they were ousted by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798.

By the 1930s, Malta was the headquarters of the British Mediterranean Fleet, and the Royal Navy was convinced that in the event of war, the island would be key to its ability to protect British interests in the region.

The British began their involvement with Malta shortly thereafter, when they came to the assistance of the Maltese, who had quickly become disillusioned with their French rulers. The island became a British protectorate in 1800 and a Crown colony in 1813. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Malta became a vital way station along Britain's lifeline to India and the Far East. By then, it was also home to the British Mediterranean Fleet, with the Admiralty having greatly improved its harbour and dockyard facilities. By the 1930s, amidst rising tensions with Italy, the Royal Navy was convinced that in the event of war breaking out, Malta would be key to its ability to protect British interests in the region.

Early Invasion Plans

In the meantime, as early as 1935, the Regia Marina (Royal Italian Navy) had been preparing plans for an attack on the island. With rising tensions brought about by the Abyssinia Crisis and the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, the Italians had to take account of the British naval base on their doorstep. In the event of war, capturing Malta was deemed a priority objective, since this would deprive the British of an important base for surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft that could otherwise hinder Italian naval operations in the region. A study of the island’s defences concluded that a force of 40,000 men would be needed to overwhelm the estimated 15,000-strong British garrison. The seaborne landings were to be supported by the entire Italian fleet and some 500 aircraft. However, the plan was deemed unrealistic as the Italians lacked the necessary resources.

On 18th June 1940, shortly after Italy had declared war against Britain and France, the Regia Marina presented a revised analysis of the earlier report. The invading force was reduced to just 20,000 men, but serious questions remained regarding the Italians’ lack of specialised troops and landing craft. Furthermore, the recent relocation of the British Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria, Egypt, due to the perceived threat of Italian air attack, as well as the RAF’s refusal to permanently station aircraft on Malta due to the fear that the island could not be defended, led to the belief that the British no longer regarded Malta as a major operational base. Italian military planners concluded that aerial bombardment and naval blockade would suffice to neutralise any threat that the island might pose.

Impact of Malta

Whilst it was true that, immediately following Italy’s declaration of war, Malta was in no position to be used as an offensive base due to the withdrawal of striking forces, the British soon started to realise the island’s potential and took full advantage of the Italian decision not to invade. Despite regular bombing raids by the Regia Aeronautica (Royal Italian Air Force) during the second half of 1940, Malta saw a gradual build-up of British air and naval units, which began to inflict losses on enemy shipping. In January 1941, a number of U-Class submarines also arrived to operate from the island, with orders to stop all supplies from Italy to Libya.

HMS Talbot, the submarine base in Malta. Malta-based submarines would sink just under 400,000 tons of Axis shipping between 1st January 1941 to 1st May 1942.

Early 1941 also saw the newly formed German Afrika Korps - commanded by Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel - being deployed to North Africa to reinforce the Italians, who, after advancing into Egypt in September 1940, had been pushed back into Libya by the British. The Germans realised the threat that Malta posed to their supply routes. To counter this, X. Fliegerkorps - a Luftwaffe (German Air Force) formation specialising in anti-shipping operations - was transferred to Sicily to attack Allied shipping in the Mediterranean and to neutralise Malta. As the aerial onslaught intensified over the following months, attacks on Axis shipping subsided, and the Axis troops in North Africa were able to receive most of their supplies. This encouraged Rommel to go on the offensive, and, by April, he had pushed the British back to the Egyptian border, recapturing all of Libya except for Tobruk, which was besieged.

That same month, Axis forces launched simultaneous invasions of Yugoslavia and mainland Greece, quickly conquering both. Their next step was to establish an operational base from which to conduct the air war over the Eastern Mediterranean. Großadmiral Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy), proposed the capture of Malta. Adolf Hitler, however, preferred the proposal of General der Flieger Kurt Student, commander of German airborne forces, for an assault on Crete. Unternehmen Merkur, spearheaded by German parachute and glider-borne forces, was launched on 20th May 1941. Although successful, the Germans suffered heavy losses, ruling out a second airborne operation against Malta for the time being. Hitler also became reluctant to authorise further large-scale airborne operations, preferring instead to employ paratroopers as ground troops.

Following the heavy losses borne by German paratroopers during the invasion of Crete, Adolf Hitler became reluctant to authorise further large-scale airborne operations. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 141-0864/CC-BY-SA 3.0)

In June 1941, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. As Luftwaffe squadrons were transferred from the Mediterranean to the Eastern Front, the Italians once more took the lead in protecting the supply lines to North Africa. Over the second half of the year, Malta earned a welcome respite following the return of the Regia Aeronautica’s ineffective hit-and-run tactics. Offensive operations from Malta regained momentum, with attacks on Axis shipping and ports by Malta-based aircraft, and various successes for the submarines and surface units. The result was that Rommel’s forces were unable to resist a strong British counter-offensive, Operation Crusader, launched on 18th November. The 'Desert Fox' was forced to withdraw, with the British Eighth Army relieving the siege of Tobruk.

Decision to Invade

For the Axis forces, the losses had become unsustainable and required urgent attention. Malta had to be neutralised, and, accordingly, towards the end of the year, II. Fliegerkorps was relocated from the Russian front to the Mediterranean. Yet, bombing alone was clearly not working. Given Malta’s resiliency to air attacks and naval blockade, an invasion seemed to be the only viable solution. Italian military planners once more began examining plans for an invasion of the island, with a joint staff, known as Ufficio C3, being formed for the purpose. This would eventually number 25 officers from all three branches of the Italian armed forces, in itself an important feat, given the generally limited inter-service cooperation.

In the early stages of the war, the Germans had left the Mediterranean theatre of operations under Italian control. Thus, they had never implemented their own formal command structure for the region. Now, however,   Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring was appointed to the new role of Oberbefehlshaber Süd (Commander-in-Chief South) to exercise control over German forces operating in the region. His brief was “to secure mastery of the air and sea in the area between Southern Italy and North Africa”, to “keep Malta in subjection”, and to “paralyse enemy traffic through the Mediterranean Sea … in close cooperation with the German and Italian naval forces available for this task.” Kesselring immediately realised that taking possession of Malta was the key to achieving all these aims. He thus became a keen supporter of Italian proposals to invade.

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-R93434/CC-BY-SA 3.0)

Kesselring immediately launched a massive air offensive against Malta to help alleviate the worsening situation in North Africa. Although the number of air raids in December 1941 doubled when compared to the previous month, worse was to come between January and April 1942, when Malta was subjected to constant day and night attacks. All airfields were temporarily rendered unusable, with only a handful of serviceable RAF fighter aircraft left to defend the island. Following the sinking of several warships, all surface vessels were withdrawn to Alexandria. The submarines followed at the end of April. At the same time, vital supplies were largely prevented from reaching Malta through attacks on British naval convoys, heightening the threat of starvation. The offensive appeared to be laying the groundwork for a potential invasion.

Kesselring had indeed, on 17th January 1942, accepted the Italian idea for an airborne and amphibious assault on Malta. On 8th February, he met General Ugo Cavallero - head of Comando Supremo (Italian Supreme Command) - and Admiral Arturo Riccardi - Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina - to discuss what ships, landing craft, and other resources would be needed, and to establish a timeframe as to when the invasion could be launched. From that point onwards, Kesselring endeavoured to persuade Hitler to support the enterprise, even convincing Rommel to back him, and, on 17th February, he got his wish. Hitler’s promise to support the Italians meant the availability of precious equipment, manpower, and raw materials needed to make the operation feasible.

Planning

For the first time ever, Italian and German military staffs worked side by side, preparing intricate plans for a joint invasion of Malta, codenamed Operazione C3 by the Italians and Unternehmen Herkules by the Germans. The Italians were also keen for advice from the Japanese, who had a lot more experience with island assault operations. By early March, a group of experts from the Japanese military mission to Rome had prepared their own plan for an invasion, which was then compared to the Italian study. Despite some differences, they agreed on certain principles, with the Italians being particularly impressed with the level of logistical planning. In the meantime, a clear timeframe was established for the Regia Marina to assemble the invasion fleet, and the Regio Esercito (Royal Italian Army) to train both the airborne troops and the landing force.

By the end of May 1942, a comprehensive plan for a combined air and seaborne assault against Malta had been completed. It called for up to 100,000 men, hundreds of aircraft for ground attack, air cover, and transportation, as well as the bulk of the available Axis surface ships and submarines in the Mediterranean. Hitler had somewhat reluctantly authorised the involvement of German paratroopers, and seeing as the Germans were the leading experts in the field, Generalmajor Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke, a veteran of the Crete assault, was appointed as senior advisor. His presence was intended to standardise training and tactics for the joint airborne forces.

Generale d'Armata Ugo Cavallero would have overall command of the operation.

A rather complicated chain of command was also agreed upon following intense negotiations between the two allies. General Cavallero would have overall command of the operation, but the Italian and German forces would receive orders through their respective service chiefs. Thus, no German troops would fall under Italian control, and vice versa. General Armando Vecchiarelli, Regio Esercito’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was to be in command of the ground forces, but the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica would retain direct control over their respective assets. The Germans were to command the airborne part of the operation, which was only fair considering their expertise in the field and the fact that they were supplying the majority of the transport planes. General Student, the brains behind the airborne assault on Crete, was appointed commander of the combined airborne forces.

Invasion Force

That airborne component would consist of two paratrooper divisions, the German 7. Flieger-Division and the Italian 185ª Divisione paracadutisti "Folgore", along with one airlanding division, the 80ª Divisione fanteria "La Spezia", totalling around 29,000 men, which roughly corresponded to the strength of Malta’s British garrison. They would be transported by 500 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft, as well as 300 DFS 230 gliders, 200 of the larger Gotha Go 242 gliders, and a small number of Messerschmitt Me 321 Gigant gliders, all supplied by the Luftwaffe. The Regia Aeronautica would contribute around 200 transport aircraft, primarily Savoia-Marchetti SM.75s, SM. 81s, and SM. 82s. Several hundred other aircraft, including bombers, torpedo bombers, fighters, and ground-attack aircraft, would also be involved.

General Kurt Student was to command the combined airborne forces. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1979-128-26/Unknown author/CC-BY-SA)

Another 65,000 men would be landed in an amphibious assault. The bulk of the first-wave troops would come from the 20ª Divisione fanteria "Friuli", the 4ª Divisione fanteria "Livorno", and the 1ª Divisione fanteria "Superga" of the Italian XXX Corpo d'Armata. They would be supported by special landing troops, including two battalions of marines from the Reggimento "San Marco", the Battaglione Nuotatori Paracadutisti from the same regiment, which specialised in sabotage operations, as well as four battalions of the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale. The second wave would be made up of troops from the 26ª Divisione fanteria "Assietta" and the 54ª Divisione fanteria "Napoli" of the XVI Corpo d'Armata. Armoured support would come from the 10° Raggruppamento Corazzato, mostly equipped with Semovente L40 da 47/32 and Semovente da 75/18 self-propelled guns, as well as the Carro Armato L3/33. Heavy armour was to be provided by the German 2.Kompanie/Panzerabteilung z.b.V.66, although this idea was eventually scrapped, with only Italian armour to be used.

The biggest headache for the Regia Marina was finding enough vessels to transport the invasion force. Due to a shortage of specialised craft, some civilian vessels were requisitioned and modified. These included two Strait of Messina railway ferries converted to carry tanks, ten passenger ships, six former passenger ferries, six cargo ships, 30 ex-trawlers, five converted minelayers, and 74 assorted motorboats. The Regia Marina also secured plans from the Kriegsmarine to build copies of the Marinefährprahm Type A in Italian shipyards. These shallow-draught vessels were capable of unloading troops, tanks, or cargo directly onto a beach. By July 1942, 65 of them had been built, giving the Italians the ability to transport 29,000 men, along with tanks, artillery, and supplies. The rest of the transportation would come from the Germans, and included 27 Marinefährprahm, 12 Siebel ferries, and a host of small assault boats.

An Italian variant of the German Marinefährprahm Type A, known as a 'Motozattera'.

The Regia Marina would also be responsible for protecting the invasion convoys from the British Mediterranean Fleet and providing gunfire support during the landings. A naval task force was thus assembled, consisting of four battleships, four heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and 21 destroyers, as well as several Italian and German submarines. They were to sortie from the ports of Messina, Reggio Calabria, Augusta, Naples, and Cagliari. It was estimated that at least 40,000 tons of diesel fuel would be needed, to be supplied by the Germans, since the Italians did not possess the required resources.

Training

In the meantime, the Regio Esercito had been busy training for the invasion. Ramcke and his pool of instructors had been impressed by the high level of morale among the officers and men of the Italian airborne units, who had also achieved a high level of interoperability with their German counterparts. The paratroopers of the Folgore Division underwent an intense program involving practice jumps, physical training, and fieldwork, followed by large-scale exercises in Sardinia and southern Italy. The La Spezia Division, on the other hand, was busy converting from an infantry to an airlanding division, while, on the plain of Catania, three glider strips were constructed.

The units tasked with carrying out the amphibious assault also underwent rigorous training. For the Italians, this type of warfare was still largely unexplored. Traditional infantry formations, for the most part undermanned and poorly equipped, would now be expected to become proficient in carrying out large-scale amphibious landings under enemy fire. Training had to be carried out in close cooperation with the Regia Marina, in order to standardise procedures. Several practice assaults were carried out along the Tuscan coast, in areas that resembled the steep, rocky shore of the Maltese Islands. The final exercise, which saw 4,500 men being safely landed along the precipitous cliffs south of Livorno, helped instil further confidence for what was to come.

Italian troops practising amphibious landing operations in preparation for the invasion of Malta.

By the end of April 1942, the Luftwaffe reported that Malta had been effectively neutralised as a naval and air base. General Cavallero optimistically ordered preparations to be stepped up, in the hope that the invasion could be executed at the end of May. Rommel also advocated for the attack to be carried out before Operation Theseus - his planned summer offensive in North Africa. The two Axis leaders, Hitler and Mussolini, met at Schloss Klessheim, in Salzburg, for a two-day conference from 29th to 30th April, where a timetable for the Axis offensive in the Mediterranean was agreed upon. Contrary to Rommel's suggestion, it was decided that Operation Theseus was to take priority. Rommel was to launch his advance at the end of May, capture Tobruk, and halt at the Egyptian border, after which the necessary resources would be released for the invasion of Malta, now scheduled for July.

Invasion Plan

Landing craft were to be assembled at the Sicilian ports of Catania, Syracuse, Licata, and Porto Empedocle. On Day X, massive air attacks against Malta would be followed by the airborne assault, launched at dusk. Paratroopers would arrive in the area between Wied iż-Żurrieq and Dingli, along the island’s southern coast, whilst, simultaneously, dummy parachutists were being dropped in the north for deception purposes. Their primary task was to establish a bridgehead from which to launch an assault on the major airfields, enabling more troops and supplies to be flown in.

That night, the first wave of seaborne landings, consisting of some 32,000 men with supporting artillery and armour, would land in the same area, preceded by underwater demolition teams and storming parties, specifically trained and equipped to climb and secure the cliffs. A secondary, concurrent amphibious attack would be carried out by naval special forces in Marsaxlokk Bay, initially to divert the defenders from the main landing. This would be supported by the La Spezia Division, which would land in gliders near Kalafrana and Bengħisa. A third landing would take place on the smaller island of Gozo, whilst fake landings would be undertaken along the northern coastline for further deception.

Map of wartime Malta, showing the location of the main airfields. (Chris How, Original Artists)

The third phase would be the breakout from the beachheads. Part of the airborne forces would move northwards to capture Ta' Qali airfield, while the other part would secure Luqa airfield. The troops from the Marsaxlokk beachhead were to move towards Birżebbuġa and, if not already taken, occupy Ħal Far and Safi airfields. That way, further reinforcements could be brought in, both by land and sea, on Day X + 1, when the invading forces were to move northwards to capture Valletta.

Cancellation

In the end, the invasion of Malta was not to be. Hitler began having second thoughts about the whole enterprise, due to his reservations about the use of airborne troops, not to mention his distrust of the Italians. The relationship between the Axis allies had never been a full-hearted one, with the Germans usually being quite dismissive of the Italians, whom they felt tended to come up with grand ideas but rarely delivered actual results. Their priorities were also different, for whereas for the Italians, the Mediterranean was their theatre, it was nothing but a distraction from the Eastern Front as far as the Germans were concerned. Whilst both parties agreed on the need to capture Malta, their inability to work together ensured that it could not happen.

Events in North Africa further doomed the operation. Following the withdrawal of British raiding forces from Malta in the first half of 1942, Rommel was able to receive thousands of tonnes of supplies, as Axis convoys once more sailed largely unmolested to North Africa. As a result, Operation Theseus was extremely successful, with the Axis forces capturing Tobruk and driving the British eastwards. Rommel requested that he be allowed to exploit the situation and continue his advance, assuring Hitler that this could be done even with Malta still in British hands. The island’s invasion was thus put on hold indefinitely.

Captured Allied troops following the fall of Tobruk to Rommel's forces in June 1942. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-785-0294-32A/Tannenberg/CC-BY-SA 3.0)

Rommel was eventually halted only 70 miles from Alexandria, at the First Battle of El Alamein, in July, as the supply situation once more deteriorated. II. Fliegerkorps had been moved out of Sicily to assist the Afrika Korps’ drive into Egypt, with the obvious result that British striking units once more started operating with impunity from Malta, targeting the Axis convoys. To compensate for Rommel’s losses, further resources earmarked for the invasion of Malta were now also transferred to North Africa, including the airborne forces, while General Student was recalled to Berlin. On 27th July, Comando Supremo officially scrapped Operazione C3, with the Italians finally accepting that it was no longer feasible.

Conclusion

Malta would continue to be a thorn in the side of Axis ambitions in North Africa. The losses inflicted on Axis shipping in the Mediterranean in the second half of 1942 would be a decisive factor in the battles to come. Axis forces were denied much-needed supplies for the Second Battle of El Alamein in late October to early November, which proved a decisive victory for the British and turned the tide of the war in North Africa. After the surrender of all Axis forces in the region in May 1943, the Allies turned their attention to Sicily, which was invaded in July, with Malta once more playing a big role in the proceedings. There is no doubt that the failure of the Italians and Germans to seize Malta from the British and use it to support their own operations in North Africa was a gross strategic failure.